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LIAR, LIAR, JURY’S THE TRIER? THE FUTURE OF 
NEUROSCIENCE-BASED CREDIBILITY 
ASSESSMENT IN THE COURT 
John B. Meixner 
ABSTRACT—Neuroscience-based creditability-assessment tests have 
recently become increasingly mainstream, purportedly able to determine 
whether an individual is lying to a certain set of questions (the Control 
Question Test) or whether an individual recognizes information that only a 
liable person would recognize (the Concealed Information Test). Courts 
have hesitated to admit these tests as evidence for two primary reasons. 
First, following the general standard that credibility assessment is a matter 
solely for the trier of fact, courts exclude the evidence because it impinges 
on the province of the jury. Second, because these methods have not been 
rigorously tested in realistic scenarios, courts rule that they do not meet the 
Daubert criteria for admissibility of expert testimony. This Comment 
argues that while neuroscience-based credibility-assessment methods 
should not currently be admissible under the Daubert standard, they may 
become admissible with more research, and the courts should avoid creating 
precedent that would preclude their admissibility once reliability issues are 
addressed. Specifically, credibility assessment should not be left entirely to 
the trier of fact because social science evidence indicates that laypeople are 
poor at making credibility-assessment judgments based on behavioral cues. 
Additionally, even if courts continue to rule that evidence assessing whether 
a witness is telling the truth invades the province of the jury, this should not 
preclude neuroscience-based credibility assessment that merely shows that 
an individual recognizes something related to the issue at hand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, Dr. Lorne Semrau was indicted for fraud after being accused 
of intentionally submitting false claims for payment to health insurance 
providers.1 Maintaining his innocence, Dr. Semrau hired Cephos,2 a forensic 
analysis company, to conduct a neuroscience-based credibility-assessment 
test to show that he was telling the truth in his denials of knowingly 
defrauding the government.3 Dr. Semrau climbed into a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner and answered a series of yes–no 
questions about the alleged fraud4: “Did you . . . cheat or defraud 
Medicare?”5 “Did you enter into a scheme to defraud the government by 
 
1  United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 
2010). 
2  Cephos is one of two companies in the United States that provides a neuroscience-based lie-
detection service. CEPHOS, http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2012). The other is No-Lie 
MRI. NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2012). Both of these companies use 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to attempt to identify brain activity that is associated 
with lying. CEPHOS, supra; NO LIE MRI, supra. While Cephos lie-detection tests have been offered (and 
rejected) as evidence in two cases (Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *3, and Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. 
L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (Sup. Ct. 2010)), there have been no recorded instances of parties 
attempting to introduce No Lie MRI tests as evidence. 
3  Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4. 
4  Id. at *4–8. fMRI is a method used to determine the level of activity in various parts of the brain. 
See Nikos K. Logothetis & Brian A. Wandell, Interpreting the BOLD Signal, 66 ANN. REV. 
PHYSIOLOGY 735, 735 (2004). 
5  Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *5. 
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billing for . . . tests conducted by psychiatrists . . . ?”6 “Have you ever done 
something illegal?”7 Dr. Steven Laken, the CEO of Cephos, subsequently 
analyzed Dr. Semrau’s brain responses to the questions and determined that 
Dr. Semrau was “not deceptive.”8 At trial, Dr. Semrau attempted to 
introduce these brain scans as evidence through the expert witness 
testimony of Dr. Laken.9 The court conducted a Daubert hearing to 
determine the reliability of the test, concluding that it was not sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted, primarily because its accuracy had not been 
thoroughly tested in “real-world” settings outside of the laboratory.10 
Contemporaneously with Dr. Semrau’s trial, an individual named 
Cynette Wilson brought suit against a temporary employment agency, 
alleging the agency retaliated against her by not placing her in work 
assignments after she reported an incident of sexual harassment.11 Ms. 
Wilson’s key witness was Ronald Armstrong, an employee of the defendant 
company, who testified that the company had instructed him not to place 
Ms. Wilson in work assignments because of her sexual harassment 
complaints.12 Like Dr. Semrau, Ms. Wilson hired Cephos to conduct a lie-
detection test, this time on Mr. Armstrong to reinforce his credibility.13 Dr. 
Laken conducted the test on Mr. Armstrong and asserted that he could tell 
“to a very high probability that Armstrong [was] being truthful when he 
testifie[d].”14 
Like the court in United States v. Semrau,15 the Wilson v. Corestaff 
Services L.P.16 court rejected the expert testimony, but relied upon entirely 
different reasoning. Rather than asserting issues of reliability, the Wilson 
court stated that “credibility is a matter solely for the jury . . . .”17 Thus, 
 
6  Id. 
7  Id. at *4. 
8  Id. at *6. 
9  Id. at *1. 
10  See id. at *9–14. Additionally, because Dr. Semrau was retested after being originally identified 
as deceptive, Dr. Laken violated Cephos’s standard protocol. See id. at *13. Under Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the controlling standard for admissibility of expert testimony in federal 
cases, “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling [a] technique’s operation” is a factor to 
consider in ruling on the admissibility of “a particular scientific technique.” 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
Presumably, the lack of a followed standard by Dr. Laken in Semrau would cut against admitting the 
test. 
11  Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15  2010 WL 6845092. 
16  900 N.Y.S.2d 639. 
17  Id. at 642. It should be noted that the Wilson case was a New York state court case, and New 
York follows the Frye standard for admissibility of expert testimony. See id. at 640. The Frye test 
requires that evidence “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In 
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because the expert testimony concerned the credibility of the witness and 
therefore “impinge[d] on the province of the jury[,] . . . [it] should be 
treated with a great deal of skepticism.”18 
These cases indicate two distinct obstacles to the admissibility of 
neuroscience-based credibility assessment: first, rules that restrict all 
credibility assessment to the trier of fact and preclude the use of expert 
testimony as an aid to the jury’s credibility assessment (the issue in Wilson), 
and second, the unreliability of the tests that prevents them from gaining 
admissibility under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the 
issue in Semrau). 
This Comment argues that while neuroscience-based credibility-
assessment methods are not currently admissible under the Daubert 
standard, further research may prove their reliability and therefore render 
them admissible. Thus, the courts should avoid creating precedent that 
would preclude their admissibility once these reliability issues are 
addressed. Specifically, because social science evidence indicates that 
laypeople are poor at making credibility-assessment judgments based on 
behavioral cues, credibility assessment should not be left entirely to the trier 
of fact if other tools, such as neuroscience, can aid them in their decision. 
Additionally, even if courts continue to rule that evidence that directly 
assesses whether a witness is telling the truth invades the province of the 
jury, this should not preclude neuroscience-based credibility assessment 
that merely shows that an individual possesses knowledge related to the 
issue at hand. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of two major types of 
neuroscience-based credibility assessment, explains the theoretical bases for 
each of those two methods, and describes the research assessing their 
accuracy. Part II reviews the social science literature on the ability of 
laypeople to assess credibility based on behavioral cues and asserts that 
judges and jurors are unlikely to effectively determine which witnesses are 
credible, and thus should not be the sole determiners of credibility. Part III 
applies the four Daubert factors to neuroscience-based credibility 
assessment and concludes that while the currently available tests should be 
inadmissible, there is promise for neuroscience-based credibility assessment 
once more realistic testing is conducted. 
 
contrast, federal courts follow the Daubert standard under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which asks 
whether the evidence is generally reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 
(1993). 
18  Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The court rejected the evidence solely on this basis, though it 
briefly mentioned that the evidence would also likely be disqualified because it was not derived from a 
method generally accepted in the scientific community, as required under Frye. Id. 
106:1451  (2012) Liar, Liar, Jury’s the Trier? 
 1455
I. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment? 
This Comment defines “neuroscience-based credibility assessment” as 
any tool that can be used to assess the veracity of a witness’s statement 
through measurements of brain activity. In particular, this Comment will 
focus on two very distinct types of neuroscience-based tests: the Control 
Question Test (CQT), which attempts to measure whether a person is telling 
the truth, and the Concealed Information Test (CIT), which attempts to 
measure whether a person has knowledge relating to a crime or other event. 
Both of these tests were traditionally conducted on the polygraph machine19 
but have since been adapted for use with techniques that measure brain 
activity. 
B. The Control Question Test 
The test that tends to come to mind most quickly when a layperson 
envisions a lie-detector test is the CQT. The CQT seeks to determine 
whether an individual is lying about a particular question by comparing the 
individual’s physiological response to that question with the individual’s 
physiological response to a “control” question.20 
The test consists of two critical items: relevant questions and control 
questions.21 Relevant questions are germane to the subject of the 
investigation (e.g., “Did you shoot your wife on the night of September 
16th, 2004?”).22 In contrast, control questions are deliberately vague 
questions about past actions that relate to the complementary relevant 
question (e.g., “Prior to September 16th, 2004, had you ever hurt 
anyone?”).23 Control questions are designed such that nearly any honest 
examinee’s truthful answer would be “yes.”24 However, through the 
interrogation process, the examinee is led to believe that he should be able 
to truthfully answer all of these control questions “no,” (because a “yes” 
 
19  See David C. Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientific, Professional, and Legal Issues 
Surrounding Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 29, 31. The 
polygraph measures “palmar sweating, blood pressure increases and respiratory changes” to determine 
the veracity of a statement or the presence of concealed information. Id. 
20  See William G. Iacono & David T. Lykken, The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 5 MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 40:47 (David L. Faigman et al. 
eds., 2011–2012). The “control” question is sometimes instead referred to as a “comparison question” 
because it is not a true control in the scientific sense of the word. Id. at § 40:48. The control question is 
not as emotionally charged as the relevant question, making it difficult to compare the two. See id. 
§ 40:73. The CIT does not have the same problem, as is discussed infra Part I.C. 
21  See id. § 40:47. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  See William G. Iacono, Detection of Deception, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 688, 688 
(John Cacioppo et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
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answer would be indicative of poor moral character, which the examinee is 
led to believe may be used against him in the investigation), and thus the 
examinee feels obligated to lie in response to the control questions.25 These 
control questions are then used as an approximation of the innocent 
examinee’s deceptive response, which is then compared to the examinee’s 
response to the relevant question.26 If the physiological response to the 
relevant question is stronger than the physiological response to the control 
question, deception is inferred.27 
Though popular among police departments and government agencies 
for eliciting confessions and screening potential employees, the CQT has 
come under criticism for its low accuracy rates.28 A recent report from the 
National Research Council stated that the theoretical rationale for the CQT 
is flawed, as an elevated physiological response to the relevant question 
would be expected even from innocent individuals because the implications 
of the relevant question are clear.29 For this reason, the CQT elicits many 
false positives—cases in which truthful individuals are classified as 
deceptive.30 
For example, suppose an individual is given a CQT test to determine 
whether he cheated on his 2003 tax return. A control question designed to 
elicit a lie might be “Have you ever taken something that didn’t belong to 
you?” Even though this question may elicit a lie (presumably a “no” 
response is a lie), and therefore some physiological arousal, when the 
participant hears the critical question, “Did you cheat on your 2003 tax 
return?,” he knows that this is the critical question that will influence 
whether he is prosecuted for a serious crime. Even if he is honest when he 
answers “no” to this question, the extreme salience of its relationship to the 
issue at hand may cause elevated physiological responses beyond that of the 
control question, leading the examiners to believe that the accused is lying 
when he is in fact telling the truth. Thus, though the polygraph-based CQT 
is sometimes proffered in court, it is rarely admitted, with a majority of 
states and federal courts disallowing it.31 Moreover, the 1923 landmark case 
regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence, Frye v. United States, 
rejected a polygraph-based precursor to the CQT because the test was not 
generally accepted in the scientific community.32 
 
25  See id. 
26  See id. at 688–89. 
27  See id. 
28  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION xiii, 19, 124–29 
(2003); Iacono, supra note 24, at 690, 693–94. 
29  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 92–95; Iacono, supra note 24, at 694. 
30  See Iacono, supra note 24, at 693. 
31  See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth, 
42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 743–44 (2009). 
32  293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court rejected a “systolic blood pressure 
deception test” used to detect deception that was highly related to the modern polygraph-based CQT. Id. 
106:1451  (2012) Liar, Liar, Jury’s the Trier? 
 1457
For more than fifty years, the CQT was conducted on the polygraph 
machine.33 The key assumption of the test was that the increased anxiety 
associated with lying to the relevant questions would result in increased 
sweating.34 Recently, however, the CQT has been adapted for use with 
fMRI.35 Rather than measuring an indirect indicator of anxiety such as 
sweating or heart rate, fMRI allows one to measure blood flow to the brain, 
which is a better proxy for brain activity (and perhaps actual deception 
itself) than are external measurements. fMRI measures brain function by 
recording the “changes in blood flow that correspond to changes in local 
brain activity.”36 Thus, when a particular area of the brain receives a greater 
quantity of oxygenated blood than other areas, one can assume that area has 
been more active.37 By identifying particular areas of the brain that are 
associated with lying, an examiner could theoretically distinguish truth 
from lies by examining which areas of the brain become active when a 
subject answers a question. 
Attempts to use this method to distinguish liars from truth tellers have 
achieved mixed results. At least one study has reported accuracy rates as 
high as 90%,38 though the design used some unrealistic methods,39 and 
another study found only 78% accuracy.40 The relative dearth of this type of 
research and the lack of replication of past studies make it difficult to 
determine the true accuracy of fMRI-based lie detection. The use of fMRI 
or other neuroimaging methods in general has rarely been admitted in the 
 
at 1013–14. The defendant in the case offered the deception test as evidence of her innocence. Id. The 
court rejected the test because it “ha[d] not yet gained . . . scientific recognition.” Id. at 1014. 
33  The original CQT was developed by John Reid in 1947 in response to the shortcomings of a 
previous similar polygraph technique called the relevant–irrelevant test. See Charles R. Honts et al., The 
Case for Polygraph Tests, in 5 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 40:22. This method 
was developed for the polygraph and continues to be used primarily with the polygraph. See id. 
34  Though palmar sweating tends to be the primary measure used in polygraph tests, blood pressure 
increases and respiratory changes are also frequently considered. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 19, at 31. 
35  See, e.g., F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005); Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from 
Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 262–63 (2005). 
36  Daniel D. Langleben et al., True Lies: Delusions and Lie-Detection Technology, 34 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 351, 359 (2006). 
37  See, e.g., Logothetis & Wandell, supra note 4, at 760 (“The BOLD response provides us 
unprecedented visibility of the neural activity in the human brain . . . .”). The term “BOLD” stands for 
blood oxygen level dependent—it is a signal that measures blood flow to various areas of the brain. See 
id. at 735–36. 
38  Kozel et al., supra note 35, at 610. 
39  The study involved the use of a “model building group” to identify approximately which neural 
networks were involved in deception for the experiment’s particular paradigm. Id. at 605–06. This 
method could not likely be used in field scenarios, where individual questions must be unique for each 
person tested. 
40  Langleben et al., supra note 35, at 267. 
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courtroom,41 and a lie-detection test using fMRI has never been ruled 
admissible. 
C. The Concealed Information Test 
The Concealed Information Test (CIT)42 is a credibility-assessment 
protocol of an entirely different nature than the CQT. Instead of attempting 
to detect actual lying (the goal of the CQT), the goal of the CIT is to 
determine whether an individual possesses knowledge of specific details of 
a crime or event.43 For example, if a murder was committed at 800 Church 
Avenue using a .38 caliber revolver, the CIT seeks to determine whether a 
suspect recognizes the address and type of weapon: 
The CIT presents subjects with various stimuli, one of which is a crime-related 
item (the probe, such as the gun used to commit a murder). Other stimuli 
consist of control items that are of the same class (irrelevants, such as other 
potentially deadly weapons: a knife, a bat, etc.) such that an innocent person 
would be unable to discriminate them from the crime-related item. If the 
subject’s physiological response is greater for the probe item than for 
irrelevant items, then knowledge of the crime or other event is inferred.44 
Like the CQT, the CIT was initially conducted using the polygraph; the 
subject was expected to show elevated arousal when viewing crime-related 
probe items.45 Since the original development of the CIT in the early 1960s, 
the test has been adapted to be used through the measurement of 
brainwaves. In 1965, Samuel Sutton and his colleagues discovered a 
particular pattern of neuronal firing that signaled an individual’s recognition 
of a unique or meaningful item.46 Because the response occurred 
approximately 300 milliseconds after the presentation of the meaningful 
item, the brainwave was eventually termed the “P300.”47 Just over twenty 
 
41  See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S. 
Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29, 39–40 (2008). For a case in which a PET scan was admitted to 
establish brain trauma, however, see Brown v. Allerton Assocs., No. 17917/03, 2006 WL 3102331 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2006). There are other contexts in which neuroimaging has been used in the 
courtroom. For a comprehensive review, see Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 
in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349 (Tade Matthias 
Spranger ed., 2012). 
42  The CIT is also frequently referred to in the literature as the “Guilty Knowledge Test” or GKT. 
See Honts et al., supra note 33, § 40:24. 
43  See Iacono & Lykken, supra note 20, § 40:107. 
44  John B. Meixner & J. Peter Rosenfeld, A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300-Based 
Concealed Information Test, 48 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 149, 149 (2011). 
45  See David T. Lykken, The GSR in the Detection of Guilt, 43 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 385, 385 
(1959) (using the polygraph to conduct the first published CIT). 
46  See Samuel Sutton et al., Evoked-Potential Correlates of Stimulus Uncertainty, 150 SCIENCE 
1187, 1187 (1965). The item must also be infrequently presented in order to generate the P300 
component. See id. 
47  See id. at 1188. 
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years later, researchers realized that the P300 could be used as a marker of 
recognition of crime-relevant information in a CIT—when an individual 
recognizes something she knows she used or saw during the commission of 
a crime, she should have a large P300 response when presented with that 
item.48 
P300-based CITs have evolved over the past twenty years and have 
achieved accuracy levels beyond those of the CQT, typically correctly 
detecting individuals that possess concealed information at a rate at or 
above 90% while keeping false positives (innocent individuals not 
possessing concealed information that are misclassified) below 10%.49 
Though the CIT is not currently used by American police forces, it is used 
in Japan to help identify the perpetrators of crimes.50 One recent CIT 
experiment reached 100% accuracy,51 and the CIT has received media 
exposure for a number of its potential uses, including counterterrorism.52 
Despite these benefits over the CQT, the CIT has rarely been submitted into 
evidence, and it has never actually influenced the outcome of a trial. 
To briefly summarize, we have now discussed two very different types 
of credibility-assessment paradigms: (1) the Control Question Test (CQT), 
which actually seeks to determine whether a statement or series of 
statements is true or false, and (2) the Concealed Information Test (CIT), 
which seeks to determine whether an individual possesses knowledge of 
information relevant to a crime or other event. It is important here to 
recognize that the CQT actually purports to determine whether an 
individual is lying, while the CIT involves no lying at all—it instead 
determines whether an individual recognizes an item that only a person 
involved in a crime would recognize. With these two paradigms as a 
foundation, we now turn to some of the potential hurdles that these tests 
must clear before they could be admitted in a court of law. 
 
48  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Truth Will Out: Interrogative 
Polygraphy (“Lie Detection”) with Event-Related Brain Potentials, 28 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 531, 531–
32 (1991); J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., A Modified, Event-Related Potential-Based Guilty Knowledge Test, 
42 INT’L J. NEUROSCIENCE 157, 157–58 (1988). 
49  See, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 152–53 (reporting high levels of detection 
accuracy among twenty-four participants in a mock terrorist attack without any advance knowledge of 
the crime-related details); J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., The Complex Trial Protocol (CTP): A New, 
Countermeasure-Resistant, Accurate, P300-Based Method for Detection of Concealed Information, 
45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 906, 913 tbl.3b (2008) (reporting 92% detection accuracy with only 8% false 
positives). 
50  See Gershon Ben-Shakhar et al., Trial by Polygraph: Reconsidering the Use of the Guilty 
Knowledge Technique in Court, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 527, 528, 536 (2002). 
51  Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 151 tbl.1. 
52  Eben Harrell, Fighting Crime by Reading Minds, TIME SCIENCE (Aug. 7, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2009131,00.html (covering Meixner & Rosenfeld, 
supra note 44). 
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II. THE JURY’S CREDIBILITY-ASSESSING ROLE AS A HURDLE TO 
ADMISSIBILITY 
A. The Current Standard of “the Jury as Lie Detector” 
Perhaps the most serious threat to the admissibility of neuroscience-
based credibility-assessment evidence is the concept that “the jury is the lie 
detector,”53 which leads to a viewpoint that “credibility is a matter solely for 
the jury.”54 This concern is regularly raised in cases in which one of the 
parties attempts to admit lie-detection evidence based on the polygraph.55 
Such a position would prevent the admission of any expert testimony 
regarding credibility, regardless of its reliability or probative value to the 
trier of fact.56 Thus, even if a lie-detection tool achieved 100% accuracy 
when used in the hands of an expert, it would likely be precluded from use 
because it would “invade the . . . province of the jury”57 and “[b]y its very 
nature . . . diminish the jury’s role in making credibility determinations.”58 
The most recent Supreme Court case in which the role of the jury was 
addressed with regard to a credibility-assessment tool was United States v. 
Scheffer.59 In Scheffer, an Air Force officer was court-martialed for 
methamphetamine use after failing a drug test.60 Prior to receiving his test 
results, the defendant took a polygraph test,61 which “indicated no 
deception.”62 By an 8–1 vote, the Court concluded that Military Rule of 
 
53  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 
907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)). 
54  Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (emphasis added). 
55  See, e.g., Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306–07, 313; State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742, 769 (Conn. 1997) 
(asserting that the principal problem in introducing polygraph-based lie-detection evidence is that it will 
“invade the fact-finding province of the jury”). It should be noted that the jury could still be the final 
determiner of credibility (and guilt) even if lie-detection evidence like the CQT were allowed into 
evidence. That is, the jury could still weigh the lie-detection evidence with all of the other evidence 
(e.g., demeanor, consistency of statements, etc.) and make a final decision as to whether they think the 
witness was being truthful. The argument made in Scheffer, however, is that the jury must be the only 
determiner of credibility, which would preclude lie-detection evidence, or any other evidence that 
directly speaks to the credibility of one of the witnesses. For extended discussion on this in the context 
of both the CQT and CIT, see infra Part II.D. 
56  See, e.g., Barnard, 490 F.2d at 912 (excluding the testimony of a psychiatrist and psychologist 
called to testify to the likelihood that another witness was telling the truth). 
57  Porter, 698 A.2d at 769. 
58  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313. 
59  523 U.S. 303. 
60  Id. at 306. 
61  The polygraph test that the defendant underwent was a CQT. Id. at 306 & n.1. The Court did not 
elaborate on the differences between the CQT and the CIT in the opinion, leaving it ambiguous as to 
whether the holding applies to polygraph tests of all varieties or merely to the polygraph-based CQT. 
For a discussion of this, see Megan J. Erickson, Note, Daubert’s Bipolar Treatment of Scientific Expert 
Testimony—From Frye’s Polygraph to Farwell’s Brain Fingerprinting, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 784–86 
(2007). 
62  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306. 
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Evidence 707, which bars the admission of polygraph evidence in court-
martial proceedings, does not violate a defendant’s right to present a 
defense.63 
However, the Justices did not agree on the reasoning by which they 
reached this holding.64 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Scalia and Souter, opined that Rule 707 serves the 
government’s legitimate interest in “[p]reserving the court members’ core 
function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials.”65 Without 
citing any empirical work or even anecdotal evidence, Justice Thomas 
simply asserted that the members of the jury “are presumed to be fitted [to 
assess credibility] by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge 
of men and the ways of men.”66 Justice Thomas stated that an expert who 
testifies regarding credibility is not providing “factual matters outside the 
jurors’ knowledge,” but is instead “supply[ing] the jury only with another 
opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the 
truth.”67 
The concurring Justices disagreed, stating that the principal opinion 
“overreach[ed]” in deciding that the introduction of lie-detection evidence 
diminishes the jury’s role as the arbiter of credibility.68 These Justices 
instead focused on the lack of scientific evidence regarding the accuracy of 
polygraph-based lie detection as the reason to prevent admissibility.69 
Indeed, the concurring opinion explicitly stated that a per se rule excluding 
expert testimony was unwise, as “some later case might present a more 
compelling case for introduction of the testimony than this one does.”70 
Justice Stevens’s dissent went even further, stating that potential injustice 
may result from blanket rules against the admissibility of entire categories 
of relevant but potentially unreliable evidence.71 
Despite the fact that the principal opinion did not provide substantive 
support for its assertion that the jury has a unique monopoly on credibility 
 
63  Id. at 305, 308. 
64  Id. at 312–14, 318 (concurring Justices joining only in the judgment and in Parts I, II.A, and II.D 
of the opinion). 
65  Id. at 312–13. This was not the only consideration by which the Court reached its holding. The 
Court also considered the broad latitude of lawmakers in restricting the presentation of evidence without 
restricting due process, id. at 308, as well as the lack of scientific consensus regarding the reliability of 
polygraph tests, id. at 309–11. Though the Court never distinguished between the CQT and CIT, both of 
which may be conducted using the polygraph, one may assume that the Court was referring only to the 
CQT, as the literature cited is regarding the CQT. 
66  Id. at 313 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)). 
67  Id. 
68  Id. at 318. 
69  Id. (“Given the ongoing debate about polygraphs, I agree the rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary 
or disproportionate that it is unconstitutional.”). 
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 327–30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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assessment, the notion has continued to be popular. In Wilson v. Corestaff 
Services L.P., the court rejected the plaintiff’s offering of fMRI-based 
credibility evidence in large part because of a concern that the evidence 
would “impinge[] on the province of the jury.”72 Applying the Frye test for 
admissibility of scientific evidence,73 the court did not cite a single peer-
reviewed study of fMRI lie detection to indicate that the method had not 
reached general acceptance in the field.74 Instead, the court asserted that the 
trial would be “complex and confusing . . . for the jury if it were faced with 
conflicting expert opinions, each with scientific authority to support it, upon 
the collateral matter of credibility.”75 The court assumed, without empirical 
assessment, that jurors are perfectly capable of assessing the credibility of 
witnesses.76 
One question remains unanswered in these opinions: Is it a bad thing to 
“diminish the jury’s role in making credibility determinations[?]”77 In other 
words, should the jury be the sole decider regarding matters of credibility? 
This determination is inevitably based on the accuracy of jurors’ credibility 
determinations. Are juries “unable or incompetent to evaluate the evidence 
and draw inferences and conclusions”78 when it comes to issues of witness 
credibility? If one of the chief goals of the trial is to resolve disputes 
accurately,79 the best approach is to admit whatever evidence will increase 
the accuracy of credibility judgments. If jurors are more accurate in their 
own credibility judgments than they would be with the assistance of expert 
 
72  900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
73  The Frye test outlines a standard where scientific evidence “must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For more discussion of this test, see infra Part III.A. 
74  See Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 641–42. 
75  Id. (quoting People v. Williams, 159 N.E.2d 549, 554 (N.Y. 1959)). 
76  See id. at 642. In rejecting the credibility-assessment evidence, the court stated that “it is well 
established that unless the jurors are unable or incompetent to evaluate the evidence and draw inferences 
and conclusions, the opinion of an expert, which intrudes on the province of the jury, is both 
unnecessary and improper.” Id. (citing Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 351 N.E.2d 735 (1976)). 
77  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998). 
78  Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642. 
79  There are other important potential goals of the trial system that may not favor outcome accuracy. 
For example, there may be a legitimate social goal of procedural justice in the trial system; that is, 
giving people the opportunity to be heard and maximizing the perceived legitimacy of the judicial 
system. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN 
LAW 65, 74–88 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001). Maximizing procedural justice could, 
in some cases, be in conflict with maximizing outcome accuracy. For example, if jurors make less 
accurate credibility assessments without the aid of expert testimony regarding credibility than they 
would with the aid of such testimony, their accuracy will be reduced by not admitting the expert 
testimony. However, the procedural justice may be increased by rejecting the testimony if perceived 
procedural fairness is strongly tied to receiving a judgment from peers regarding the truthfulness of 
testimony, rather than from an expert. While it is not clear how procedural justice may be influenced by 
experts testifying with regard to credibility, a complete discussion of this is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. The remainder of this Comment will focus on policies that maximize outcome accuracy. 
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testimony on the matter, then the testimony should not be allowed because 
it would confuse an already-accurate trier of fact. However, if jurors are 
inaccurate in their credibility assessments, a universal rule restricting 
credibility assessment to the jurors’ own evaluations—thereby excluding 
expert testimony on the matter—could lead to less accurate decisions. 
Thus, the merit of a rule that categorically excludes expert testimony 
regarding witness credibility turns on the ability of the trier of fact to assess 
witness credibility on its own. Because there is a well-developed literature 
on the ability of laypeople to assess credibility, empirical analysis can 
inform decisions regarding the rule. The remainder of Part II reviews the 
literature on laypeople’s ability to assess credibility without the aid of 
assessment tools like the polygraph or fMRI, and concludes that jurors are 
likely to be inaccurate in assessing credibility based on demeanor cues. 
Additionally, while jurors may potentially be better when using contextual 
cues, the research is not sufficiently well-developed to reach a strong 
conclusion. 
B. Credibility Assessment Based on Demeanor 
It seems only natural to assume that individuals can detect lies of 
others based on factors like facial expressions, tone of voice, aversion of 
gaze, and general nervousness. After all, nearly everyone has had the 
experience of lying to a friend or parent and being unable to look that 
person in the eye. The notion that we are able to distinguish between truth 
and lies is ubiquitous in our media as well. For example, the television 
show Lie to Me focused on Dr. Cal Lightman, a fictional deception expert 
whose character is loosely based on deception researcher Dr. Paul Ekman.80 
According to the show’s website: 
If you lie to Lightman, he’ll see it in your face and your posture or hear it in 
your voice. If you shrug your shoulder, rotate your hand or even just slightly 
raise your lower lip, Lightman will spot the lie. By analyzing facial 
expressions and involuntary body language, he can read feelings ranging from 
hidden resentment to sexual attraction to jealousy.81 
Even the Supreme Court has perpetuated the idea that one’s demeanor 
is likely to reveal his lies. In Coy v. Iowa, a Confrontation Clause case in 
which the defendant was charged with sexual assault, the Court stated, “It is 
always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind 
his back.’ In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told 
less convincingly.”82 
 
80  See The (Real!) Science Behind Fox’s Lie to Me, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 
AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/4300722. 
81  Lie to Me, PAUL EKMAN GROUP, http://awstats.paulekman.com/drupal/?q=Lie-to-me (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2012) (summarizing the former television show’s website). 
82  487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). 
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It would be wonderful if judges and jurors were able to determine the 
credibility of witnesses by carefully staring at the witnesses’ shoulders and 
lower lips during testimony, but an abundance of research into laypeople’s 
and trained individuals’ ability to detect lies has shown that people are 
simply not very good at detecting lies by analyzing demeanor.83 
Additionally, training individuals to look for certain demeanor-based cues 
does not significantly improve accuracy; in fact, it increases misplaced 
confidence in one’s own abilities to detect lies and leads to a bias toward 
suspecting others’ untruthfulness.84 
Early studies that sought to determine what types of behavioral cues 
were associated with deception typically utilized referees who would 
simply count the instances of a particular behavior when an individual 
(called the sender) was either lying or telling the truth.85 For example, a 
listener would record each instance that a sender blinked while the sender 
was lying, and again while the sender was telling the truth. These studies 
found some relationships between certain types of demeanors and 
deception, such as eye movements, mouth movements, stiffness of postures, 
and relaxation.86 However, when individuals in these early studies 
attempted to differentiate between equally true and false statements, they 
only achieved accuracy levels between 45% and 60%.87 
These studies typically restrict the listener’s interaction such that the 
only cues that she could use to detect deception are verbal and nonverbal 
demeanor cues, as opposed to cues gleaned from the content of the message 
(e.g., consistency, detail). For example, Ekman and Maureen O’Sullivan 
conducted an experiment in which listeners were shown ten one-minute 
samples from interviews of college-aged women describing their feelings 
about a nature film they were watching.88 Half of these women were 
actually watching the nature film and truthfully describing their positive 
feelings, while the other half were watching a gruesome film that was 
upsetting to them and were lying about having positive feelings.89 Groups of 
individuals observed these interviews to determine the veracity of the 
statements.90 
 
83  See infra Part II.C. 
84  See infra text accompanying notes 95–112. 
85  See Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, 14 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 11 (1981). Extensive review of these early demeanor studies is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a review of these studies, see Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to 
Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003), and, Zuckerman, supra. 
86  See Zuckerman, supra note 85, at 41–44 apps. 1A–1B. 
87  Id. at 26. 
88  Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 915 
(1991). 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 914–15. The different groups included college students, psychiatrists, judges, robbery 
investigators, federal polygraphers, and Secret Service agents. Id. 
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Aside from Secret Service agents, every group was near chance 
accuracy, ranging from 52% to 57% accurate.91 Additionally, prior to 
viewing the tape, each listener was asked to estimate his ability to tell when 
other people are lying, and then was asked to estimate how well he had 
done on assessing the interviews.92 Neither estimate was significantly 
correlated with accuracy on the task, indicating that the listeners were 
unable to discern how effectively they determined credibility based on 
demeanor evidence.93 
One interesting result of the Ekman and O’Sullivan study, however, 
was that Secret Service agents were considerably more accurate than the 
other groups, achieving 64% accuracy.94 This leads to an important 
question: Could laypeople, such as jurors, be trained to better recognize 
deception based on demeanor evidence, thereby making the jury an efficient 
lie detector and alleviating the need for expert testimony regarding 
credibility? 
A series of studies by Saul Kassin and colleagues involving mock 
crime interrogations sheds some light on this question. In a first study, eight 
college students were instructed to commit a mock crime, while eight others 
committed a related innocent act.95 All of the students then underwent a 
five-minute interrogation, during which the students were instructed to deny 
having committed any crime.96 The interrogations were taped and shown to 
forty students who were asked to assess the veracity of the senders’ 
denials.97 Prior to watching the interrogations, half of the forty students 
were trained for thirty minutes in the Reid Technique98—a method that uses 
verbal and nonverbal cues to detect deception.99 Those students who were 
not trained in the Reid Technique had an accuracy rate of 52%, while those 
individuals that were trained achieved an accuracy of only 45%.100 This 
lower accuracy rate was compounded by the fact that those individuals 
 
91  Id. at 916 & tbl.2. 
92  Id. at 915. 
93  Id. at 916–17. 
94  Id. at 916 tbl.2. 
95  Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth 
and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501–03 (1999). Subjects 
committed one of four possible crimes, such as vandalizing the wall of a university building. Id. 
Innocent acts involved going to the same location, but not committing any crime. Id. 
96  Id. at 503–04. 
97  Id. at 506. 
98  Id. at 505. 
99  The Reid Technique is the leading method of training law enforcement officials to conduct 
interrogations, detect deception, and elicit confessions. The method is outlined in a book co-authored by 
John Reid. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 187–90 (5th ed. 
2013). 
100  Kassin & Fong, supra note 95, at 508. It should be noted that this accuracy is less than chance, 
indicating that the method is actually reducing lie-detection ability, rather than augmenting it. 
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trained in the Reid Technique had higher confidence than those not trained, 
despite their reduced accuracy.101 
This phenomenon has been replicated in several follow-up studies 
examining highly trained police officers’ abilities to assess the veracity of 
interview statements. In a 2002 study, Christian Meissner and Kassin 
presented highly trained and experienced police investigators with the same 
interrogation videos used in the 1999 Kassin and Christina Fong study 
described above.102 Like the students of the Kassin and Fong study, the 
investigators were no better than chance at detecting deception in the 
interrogations and yet were more confident in their judgments than were the 
trained students.103 Once again, investigator confidence was not correlated 
with accuracy.104 Notably, both the trained officers and trained students 
were more likely to misdiagnose truthful senders as deceptive,105 reflecting 
a bias in trained individuals towards assuming that senders will be 
deceptive.106 
Although these are only a few of the many studies conducted regarding 
laypeople’s ability to assess demeanor evidence, several authors have 
conducted meta-analyses107 that combine data from a number of studies and 
look for literature-wide effects. The most comprehensive of these is a 2006 
meta-analysis by Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo, which combined the 
results of 206 studies that included over 24,000 individuals “who judge[d] 
deception from a brief encounter with an unfamiliar sender in real time.”108 
Across this extremely large sample gathered from a variety of different labs 
and researchers, the authors found a 54% overall accuracy of deception 
 
101  Id. at 509. Confidence was measured by asking each receiver to self-rate his confidence, on a 
scale from one to ten, after viewing each interrogation. Id. 
102  Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of 
Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 474 (2002). The investigators had an average of 
nearly fourteen years of experience and 68% of the investigators had undergone formal training in the 
detection of deception. Id. 
103  Id. at 475 tbl.2, 476. 
104  Id. at 476. 
105  Id. at 475 tbl.2. 
106  Meissner and Kassin found this “more liberal response criterion” (i.e., a tendency to assume that 
others are lying more frequently than telling the truth) in a number of other studies of individuals trained 
in using demeanor evidence to detect deception. Id. at 472–73 & tbl.1 (citing Paul Ekman et al., A Few 
Can Catch a Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263 (1999); Kassin & Fong, supra note 95; Stephen Porter et al., 
Truth, Lies, and Videotape: An Investigation of the Ability of Federal Parole Officers to Detect 
Deception, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 643 (2000)). 
107  A meta-analysis is “the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from 
individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings.” Gene V. Glass, Primary, Secondary, and 
Meta-Analysis of Research, 5 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3, 3 (1976). Typically, a meta-analysis uses statistical 
methods to find the size of a particular effect that has been measured by an entire field of research. See 
id. 
108  Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 216–17, 219 (2006). 
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judgments, much like the accuracy rates found in the Kassin and Ekman 
studies above.109 This meta-analysis excluded studies that involved training, 
so it does not speak to the confidence and bias effects mentioned above,110 
but a number of other studies have found effects of training similar to those 
found by Meissner and Kassin.111 
These studies raise serious concerns about jurors’ ability to assess 
credibility based on demeanor evidence. If jurors are untrained, they are 
likely to be only slightly above chance accuracy. Moreover, brief training 
like that used in the 1999 Kassin and Fong study is unlikely to make jurors 
more accurate assessors of credibility. Perhaps extensive training and 
experience of the kind provided to Secret Service agents could help increase 
jurors’ abilities slightly, but this is probably unrealistic for jurors who have 
only a short period of time to receive instructions from the court.112 
Additionally, even if such training was sufficiently cost and time 
efficient to be feasible and was able to produce small increases in accuracy 
like those found by Ekman, the increased confidence associated with the 
training could still be highly problematic in the courtroom. When a juror 
hears testimony, the credibility of the witness is only one of the factors he 
must consider. He must also consider things such as the quality of the 
evidence, the weight to be given to that evidence, and the influence of the 
evidence on previous information. If a juror is highly confident in his ability 
to assess the veracity of the witness’s statements, that juror may completely 
disregard evidence when he suspects a witness is lying, even when the 
witness provides reliable evidence that carries strong weight. Thus, 
confidence in credibility assessment is a detriment to accuracy when those 
assessments themselves are inaccurate. 
Likewise, the bias that Meissner and Kassin found toward assuming 
others are deceptive as a result of the deception training could further 
undermine accuracy in the courtroom. In controlled experiments where 
there is an equal balance between truthful and deceptive statements, this 
bias may only have a small effect on overall accuracy, depending on the 
strength of the bias. But in the courtroom, where it is likely that the 
majority of witnesses are telling the truth, a bias toward assuming witnesses 
are deceptive could reduce jurors’ assessments of credibility to well below 
chance levels. 
 
109  Id. at 219. 
110  Id. at 218. 
111  See supra note 106. 
112  One criticism of training paradigms like the one used by Kassin and Fong is that they are so 
short that they are virtually guaranteed to be ineffective. However, in the trial context, the thirty minute 
training session is likely very close to the maximum of what could be employed by the court, given the 
demands placed on a jury. Even if time constraints were not a factor, the cost of serious training would 
likely be prohibitive. 
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C. Credibility Assessment Based on Content 
Though the behavioral research discussed above has not gained 
traction in the courts, a number of legal scholars have written on the 
topic.113 The majority of these discussions have focused on research 
examining credibility assessment through demeanor evidence alone, and 
have thus concluded that jurors are likely ineffective credibility assessors.114 
Recently, however, Max Minzner noted that the literature focusing on 
demeanor evidence alone does not fully describe the jury’s ability to assess 
credibility.115 In addition to demeanor, the jury may use the context, 
consistency, and depth of witnesses’ statements to determine their veracity. 
Thus, the experiments by Kassin, Ekman, and their ilk may capture 
only a small amount of what juries actually do in the courtroom to assess 
credibility. By allowing individuals to assess only a short segment of 
testimony, these experiments prevent receivers from comparing the sender’s 
story with others’ stories, as a juror would be able to do while listening to 
multiple witnesses at trial. 
Two distinct questions arise from the shortcomings of the demeanor 
studies. First, do jurors use context, consistency, and depth to assess 
credibility in the courtroom? Second, if they do use the full amount of 
information available at trial, are jurors accurate in making credibility 
determinations? Minzner cites two studies in support of the position that 
jurors do rely on context.116 
In the first study, Hee Sun Park and her collaborators conducted a 
survey of 202 undergraduate students in which they asked participants “to 
recall a recent situation in which they had discovered that someone had lied 
to them . . . and recall as much information as they could about what 
happened.”117 After this free recall period, participants were asked several 
questions about the instance they recalled, including one question about 
how they detected the lie.118 The survey found that 32% of the lies were 
detected through third-party information, 31% were detected through a 
 
113  See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of 
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157 (1993); Joseph W. Rand, 
The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Chris William 
Sanchirico, “What Makes the Engine Go?” Cognitive Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER 
L. REV. 507 (2009). 
114  See supra Part II.B. 
115  See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2557, 2564 (2008) (“Today’s findings . . . are far more complex than the then-current research and give 
us a much greater ability to identify those situations in which we need to worry about mistaken 
judgments about credibility and those in which we do not.”). 
116  Id. at 2567–68. 
117  Hee Sun Park et al., How People Really Detect Lies, 69 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 144, 149 (2002). 
118  Id. at 149–50. The question read, “Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to 
you. Describe in as much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the lie: how exactly 
did you find out that the person lied to you?” Id. at 150. 
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combination of various methods, 18% were detected through physical 
evidence, and only 2% were detected with demeanor-based evidence.119 
While these results are interesting, they are flawed for a number of 
reasons. First, because the participants were invited to freely recall a single 
instance in which they detected a lie, they might be biased toward recalling 
certain instances more than others. For example, if it is easier to detect a lie 
by discovering third-party information that exposes the lie than it is to 
detect the lie by demeanor, participants may be more likely to recall those 
lies detected via third-party information, skewing the results.120 Similarly, 
there might be categorical differences in the extent to which people recall 
detecting lies based on information compared to detecting lies based on 
demeanor, regardless of which method is more common. 
But even assuming that these individuals are correctly recalling what 
methods they used and that they selected the lie they described without any 
bias, the data still do not indicate how jurors might assess credibility. The 
situations that the participants described were likely vastly different from 
what a juror would hear in court. The majority of lies in the Park study were 
detected through third-party information or physical evidence,121 both of 
which are unlikely to happen in the courtroom. The authors do not define 
what they mean by “third party information,” but one can reasonably 
assume this means that a trusted source contradicted the liar in a way that 
could be confirmed. While there is contradiction aplenty in the courtroom, a 
witness would rarely make such a blatant lie that some piece of evidence 
provided at trial would clearly expose that lie, because witnesses know 
what evidence is going to be presented. This situation is distinct from lies 
outside of the courtroom, where the liar might assume that the receiver will 
not discover any information that would clearly expose the lie. It is 
precisely because lies cannot be easily detected in the courtroom via other 
witnesses or physical evidence that jurors might turn to demeanor-based 
cues. 
Though the Park study tells us little about what actual jurors are doing 
to assess credibility in the courtroom, the second study cited by Minzner 
does support the notion that jurors use context in their credibility 
determinations. In a large and ongoing line of research, Shari Seidman 
Diamond examined questions asked by jurors in fifty civil cases in Arizona 
state courts, where jurors are allowed to present questions to witnesses in 
civil cases.122 Diamond and colleagues found that 42% of all juror questions 
 
119  Id. 
120  This phenomenon is referred to in the psychological literature as the availability heuristic. For a 
more complete description, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
121  Park, supra note 117, at 150. 
122  Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1937 (2006). Jurors are allowed to present questions in Arizona state civil 
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were what the authors labeled as “cross-checking,” questions in which 
“jurors apply a commonsense structure to evaluating potentially unreliable 
sources of information.”123 Essentially, these questions reflect the jurors’ 
attempt to find consistency across a large number of potentially inconsistent 
stories that they have heard from all of the witnesses. This information was 
often sought from a disinterested witness who might be able to provide a 
reliable fact against which the testimony from the interested witnesses 
could be compared.124 
While this study is informative because it shows that jurors use 
coherence of stories to assess credibility, jurors’ questions to the witnesses 
are unlikely to capture all of the considerations that comprise their 
determinations. For example, it seems highly unlikely that a juror would ask 
a witness a question about demeanor (e.g., “Why did you appear so nervous 
on the stand?”). Thus, the study does not provide a comparison point to 
know how much credibility assessments are influenced by demeanor as 
opposed to content-based cross-checking. 
One other limitation of the Diamond study is that forty-seven of the 
fifty cases sampled were tort cases, most of which involved either a motor 
vehicle crash or medical malpractice.125 It is possible that the jurors’ 
credibility assessment varies by context. Perhaps in those cases where 
liability turns on the veracity of two contradictory testimonies, such as 
those of a single eyewitness and a criminal defendant, there will be reduced 
context from which jurors can draw to make content-based decisions of 
credibility. In such cases, jurors may rely more on demeanor in making 
their credibility assessments. 
Despite these limitations, it seems very likely that jurors use context to 
determine the consistency of a witness’s testimony, though it is not yet clear 
how this compares to the use of demeanor. Regardless, this leads to the next 
question in the analysis: If jurors do use context to determine credibility, 
does this lead to more accurate assessments of credibility than the use of 
demeanor evidence? Minzner argues that by placing all of the information 
heard at trial into context and examining the differences between the 
statements of various witnesses, the jury can accurately assess credibility 
without needing to consider demeanor evidence.126 Minzner discusses two 
studies by Maria Hartwig to support this view.127 
In the first study, Hartwig used the same crime and interrogation 
paradigm of the 1999 Kassin and Fong study described above. College 
 
cases. The rule provides that “[j]urors shall be permitted to submit to the court written questions directed 
to witnesses or to the court.” ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10) (2011). 
123  Diamond et al., supra note 122, at 1956–57. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 1937. 
126  See Minzner, supra note 115, at 2567–68. 
127  Id. at 2568–69. 
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students were instructed to either commit a mock crime by stealing a wallet 
out of a briefcase in a movie store, or an innocent act by going into the 
video store and leaving.128 Then, subjects were interrogated as in the 1999 
Kassin and Fong study, with all students denying commission of the 
crime.129 However, in this experiment, the time at which the interrogator 
disclosed the evidence against the student was varied. In an “early 
disclosure” condition, the interrogator presented three items of evidence 
against the student at the beginning of the interrogation and then provided 
the student a “free recall” period to explain what happened.130 In a 
complementary “late disclosure” condition, the interrogator withheld the 
three pieces of evidence from the student, first providing a free recall period 
and then presenting the evidence against the student at the end of the 
interrogation.131 After the interviews, 116 students viewed the tape of one of 
the interrogations and judged the veracity of the statements made by the 
suspects.132 Overall accuracy was 53%, but those observing the early 
disclosure interrogations were only 43% accurate while the late disclosure 
group was 62% accurate.133 
Minzner argues that the late disclosure condition is a better simulation 
of the jury’s experience, and thus, juries are more likely to accurately assess 
credibility than the previous demeanor-based experiments implied.134 
However, there are still problems in applying the Hartwig study to the 
courtroom. First, while late disclosure strategy could readily be employed 
in interrogation rooms, witnesses in the courtroom likely have a solid 
understanding of what questions will be asked and what evidence will be 
relevant to those questions. While the interrogators in the Hartwig study 
could easily withhold some evidence, get a story from the suspect, and then 
present the evidence to the suspect to probe for inconsistencies, attorneys 
attacking credibility on cross-examination will rarely have this opportunity. 
In civil cases, where discovery provides all parties with the relevant 
evidence, a lying witness has plenty of time and information to craft a 
consistent story. Even in criminal cases, suspects may know, from their 
 
128  Maria Hartwig et al., Detecting Deception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence, 29 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 473–74 (2005). 
129  Id. at 473. 
130  Id. at 475. The three pieces of evidence claimed against the student were that one witness had 
seen the student outside the video store, that one witness had seen the student inside the video store, and 
that the student’s fingerprints were contained on the briefcase from which the wallet was stolen. Id. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 476. 
133  Id. at 477. 
134  See Minzner, supra note 115, at 2571 (“What do these results about demeanor, bias, and context 
indicate about lie detection in the legal system? . . . When a legal decision-maker possesses private 
information and uses it to probe the witness’s story, lie detection accuracy will improve. . . . If the police 
and juries have multiple independent sources of information about an event, they are far more likely to 
accurately decide which witnesses to believe.”). 
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interactions with the police, enough of the evidence against them such that 
they can form a coherent story.135 Perhaps jurors could watch a video of the 
interrogation and assess credibility based on that video. But this would 
require a shift in police policy, since evidence is quickly disclosed to the 
suspect in the majority of interrogations.136 This method would also only be 
effective in criminal cases where there is an interrogation to be shown to the 
jurors, and overconfidence of interrogators may influence the interrogation 
and bias the jury. Additionally, while the late disclosure method increased 
accuracy among passive viewers in credibility assessment, it still only 
resulted in 62% accuracy. Is this level of accuracy sufficient to declare that 
the jury is so good at detecting lies that it should be the sole credibility 
assessor? 
It is also notable that the observers in the late disclosure condition were 
not equally adept at classifying both truth telling and lying: 68% of the 
deceptive interrogations were correctly classified compared to only 54% of 
the truthful interrogations.137 This has implications for the normative 
distribution of outcomes in the trial system. For example, employing the 
late disclosure method would presumably reduce the perceived credibility 
of a defendant who chooses to testify, since the data suggest that more liars 
would be correctly classified than truth tellers. This could increase the 
number of verdicts rendered against criminal defendants—a high price to 
pay for a small increase in the accuracy of credibility judgments. 
In a follow-up to their 2005 study, Hartwig and colleagues trained 
police officers in employing the late disclosure interrogation method.138 
Mock crimes and interrogations were conducted as in the 2005 Hartwig 
study,139 but in this experiment, the interrogators themselves judged the 
veracity of the suspects’ statements.140 The interviewers trained to use the 
late disclosure strategy reached an accuracy level of 85%, while the 
 
135  Such knowledge could arise from several different sources. Police may reveal evidence to the 
suspect during interrogation. See Hartwig, supra note 128, at 470. Additionally, certain types of 
evidence must be revealed to the defendant prior to trial, such as documents that the prosecution plans to 
use in its case-in-chief or the testimony of expert witnesses, which will typically include forensic 
experts. See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 16(a)(1)(E)–(F). 
136  Hartwig, supra note 128, at 470 (“In an American study, this disclosure of evidence, often 
together with a suggestion of guilt, was the typical way to start the interrogation, and occurred in more 
than 80% of the cases.” (citing Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996))). 
137  Id. at 478. 
138  Maria Hartwig et al., Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When Training to 
Detect Deception Works, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 608 (2006) (“[The officers] were trained in 
planning and asking questions concerning the evidence without disclosing it to the suspect. For example, 
if the case-file included information that a suspect’s car had been seen close to a crime scene on the day 
of the crime, they were taught to plan and ask questions about the suspect’s car . . . . They then practiced 
the strategic use of [this] technique on each other several times . . . .”). 
139  Id. at 608–10. 
140  Id. at 610. 
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interviewers using the early disclosure strategy were accurate only 56% of 
the time.141 
While these results are more striking than those of the 2005 Hartwig 
study, they are also much less applicable to jurors. At trial, the jury is 
simply the passive observer of evidence, not the interrogator. Juries cannot 
employ the late disclosure method themselves as in the 2006 Hartwig 
experiment. While the interrogators using the late disclosure strategy were 
very accurate in their own credibility assessments, it is not clear whether 
passive observers would be as accurate, and in fact they were not as 
accurate in the 2005 Hartwig study. Additionally, the 2006 Hartwig study 
used a three-hour training protocol,142 which might be more training than the 
judicial system is willing to devote to teach jurors about credibility 
assessment, especially when that training may not even be effective. 
D. Should the Jury Be the Lie Detector? 
It is clear that there is a gap in the literature with regard to the jury’s 
ability to assess credibility. While studies confining the assessment of 
credibility to demeanor-based evidence have shown that individuals have 
poor accuracy, studies in which individuals are able to use context reflect 
improved accuracy. However, none of these studies are directly applicable 
to the courtroom setting. There has not been a systematic study in which 
individuals hear inconsistent testimony from multiple senders and then 
assess the credibility of each sender, as jurors would in the courtroom. 
When more sophisticated research like this is conducted, researchers will 
have a better grasp of the extent to which jurors can assess the credibility of 
witnesses without the help of experts. 
For now, however, the legal community is left with an incomplete 
understanding. Even the most optimistic studies that are remotely 
applicable to the courtroom suggest that individuals are just over 60% 
accurate in credibility assessments.143 Yet courts continue to hold onto the 
shaky assumption that the jury is capable of being the sole assessor of 
credibility. This unsophisticated notion should be put to rest, as Justice 
Kennedy suggested in United States v. Scheffer,144 and the only factor 
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony related to credibility 
should be its reliability under Daubert or Frye. 
 
141  Id. at 613. 
142  Id. at 608. 
143  See Hartwig et al., supra note 128, at 477. 
144  523 U.S. 303, 318–19 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“[I]t seems the principal opinion overreaches when it rests its holding on the additional ground that the 
jury’s role in making credibility determinations is diminished when it hears polygraph evidence. . . . [It] 
demeans and mistakes the role and competence of jurors . . . .”). 
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However, the court does not lightly change its doctrine in response to 
social science evidence,145 so courts will likely continue to be skeptical of 
neuroscience-based credibility-assessment evidence based on the notion 
that it “impinges on the province of the jury.”146 What does this mean for 
the admissibility of both the CQT and the CIT? If the jury is considered the 
sole assessor of credibility, it almost surely strikes the death knell for the 
CQT, which purports to directly identify truths and lies. As seen in Wilson 
v. Corestaff Services L.P., courts following the standard laid out in Scheffer 
will likely continue to reject a CQT test, whether it is conducted using 
polygraph or fMRI, without even having to consider its reliability. 
The CIT, however, may not violate the Scheffer standard because it is 
much more like substantive evidence than it is like credibility assessment. 
While the results of a CIT may undermine the credibility of a witness 
indirectly, the CIT (unlike the CQT) makes no direct claims as to whether a 
witness is lying or telling the truth. Instead, the CIT provides substantive 
evidence and leaves the credibility assessment itself to the jury. For 
example, if an individual defending a murder charge maintains he was not 
at the crime scene, but the results of a CIT indicate that he recognized the 
murder weapon, the CIT itself does not indicate that he is lying. Instead, it 
provides substantive evidence that is probative for the trier of fact’s 
ultimate conclusion about the veracity of his testimony. Similarly, a blood 
sample found at the scene of the crime that contains the defendant’s DNA 
strongly undermines the defendant’s claim of innocence, but we would not 
consider it credibility-assessment evidence. If substantive evidence like this 
were to be considered credibility-assessment evidence, every piece of 
relevant evidence, by definition, would go to the veracity of the defendant’s 
plea of “not guilty” or “not liable” and would therefore be inadmissible. 
Despite the fact that logical analysis would group the CIT with other 
substantive evidence, the CIT is in danger of being grouped with the CQT 
as a pure credibility-assessment device for several reasons. First, because 
the CIT was first conducted using the polygraph,147 it is likely to continue to 
be associated with the CQT, which is a credibility-assessment test at its 
very core. Courts have not overtly made the distinction between the CIT 
and the CQT, frequently just referring to both as “polygraph” evidence,148 
but not referencing each test’s merits and flaws.149 
 
145  See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287, 291 n.7 (1987) (accepting a social science 
study as demonstrating that “black defendants . . . who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of 
receiving the death penalty” but reading the results narrowly and as insufficient to support a 
constitutional challenge). 
146  Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
147  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
148  See Erikson, supra note 61, at 785–86. 
149  See, e.g., Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309 (“[T]here is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is 
reliable.” (emphasis added)). 
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Second, even though the CIT does not detect any actual lying, because 
the CIT only provides evidence of a mental state, courts could still draw a 
distinction between the CIT and other forms of substantive forensic 
evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA samples. The court may consider any 
test of brain activity to be one of credibility assessment in nature, regardless 
of whether the test is identifying lies or simply the presence of concealed 
information. Third, because the history of the CIT is so intertwined with 
that of the CQT, the association between the tests will be difficult to 
countermand. The CIT was born out of frustrations with the theoretical and 
practical shortfalls of the CQT.150 The CIT literature is rife with debate over 
which method is more accurate and reliable, and the community could be 
described as being split into two rival factions: CIT proponents and CQT 
proponents.151 Many CIT articles are prefaced by the shortcomings of the 
CQT, espousing the CIT as a valid alternative.152 This type of language 
implies that the two tests are performing the same credibility-assessing job, 
despite the fact that they actually have very different functions. And many 
published CIT articles are titled in ways that imply the CIT is a deception-
detection tool, rather than a recognition-detection tool.153 
To summarize, we have seen that under Scheffer, scientific expert 
testimony whose relevance is the credibility of one of the witnesses at trial 
will be excluded on the basis that the jury itself should assess the credibility 
of the witnesses. However, we have also seen that laypeople are usually at 
or below chance accuracy in assessing whether individuals are lying based 
purely on demeanor. Training is unlikely to help jurors become better 
credibility assessors and may actually make them worse by causing them to 
be overconfident in their credibility assessments to the detriment of 
assessments they may be more effective at making, such as the 
determination of the quality of the evidence presented. Jurors likely assess 
credibility based on the content of the message in addition to demeanor, but 
there is no strong evidence suggesting that jurors are effective at detecting 
 
150  See Iacono, supra note 24, at 689 (“The [CIT] . . . has been developed and promoted by Lykken 
as a scientifically based alternative to the CQT.”); Lykken, supra note 45, at 385 (“Use of physiological 
measurements to detect not lying, but the presence of ‘guilty knowledge,’ requires . . . [a] more 
reasonable assumption [than those required by the CQT].”). Notably, the very first paragraph of the very 
first CIT study ever published focused on the shortcomings of more traditional “lie detector” tests. 
Lykken, supra note 45, at 385. 
151  Compare Iacono & Lykken, supra note 20, § 40:45–119 (writing a chapter titled “The Case 
Against Polygraph Tests,” describing shortcomings of the CQT and related tests and instead favoring the 
CIT), with Honts et al., supra note 33, § 40:20–44 (writing a countering chapter entitled “The Case for 
Polygraph Tests,” arguing in favor of the CQT and related tests’ validity). 
152  See, e.g., Ralf Mertens & John J.B. Allen, The Role of Psychophysiology in Forensic 
Assessments: Deception Detection, ERPs, and Virtual Reality Mock Crime Scenarios, 
45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 286, 286 (2008) (“Conventional field polygraph examinations, based on the 
control-question technique (CQT), suffer from many limitations and have been widely criticized in the 
scientific literature.”). 
153  See, e.g., Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48; Mertens & Allen, supra note 152. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1476 
lies through the content of the testimony, as the research done in this area is 
not a good analogue for the experience of the juror at trial. Thus, if accuracy 
is an important motivator, the current social science data counsel against 
allowing the jury to function as the sole assessor of credibility. 
III. THE DAUBERT CRITERIA AS A HURDLE TO ADMISSIBILITY 
If the court does not revise the “jury [as] the lie detector” doctrine 
explained in Scheffer,154 the court will not reach the second stage of 
analysis: whether the CQT and CIT are reliable enough to meet the standard 
laid out in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. However, as discussed in Part II, 
social science research may eventually push the court to consider allowing 
experts to assist the trier of fact in the credibility-assessment role. Even if 
courts do not revise their stance on experts offering credibility-assessment 
evidence but are willing to accept the CIT as substantive evidence rather 
than credibility-assessment evidence, the court will need to assess its 
reliability in determining admissibility. This Part examines the potential 
admissibility of the CIT and, to a lesser extent, the CQT, under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
A. Frye v. United States, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and the  
Daubert Standard 
For nearly seventy years, admissibility of scientific expert testimony 
was determined under the standard laid out in Frye v. United States, a case 
that itself actually decided admissibility of a type of credibility-assessment 
evidence.155 In that case, the D.C. Circuit outlined a “general acceptance” 
test under which any scientific evidence that is to be admissible “must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.”156 While this was not a Supreme Court decision, 
federal courts generally followed this until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.157 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted that the Frye standard had been 
the subject of frequent debate.158 Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
the Court stated that the Rule does not indicate that “general acceptance” is 
 
154  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)). 
155  293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (ruling that the “systolic blood pressure deception test,” a 
precursor to the polygraph-based CQT, had not gained “general acceptance” among physiological and 
psychological authorities and therefore should not be admitted as evidence). 
156  Id. at 1014. 
157  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
158  Id. at 586. 
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a requirement of reliability.159 In fact, the advisory committee notes to the 
originally enacted version of Rule 702 never mention “general acceptance,” 
and instead state that “[w]hether the situation is a proper one for the use of 
expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier.”160 
The advisory committee notes to the proposed 1991 amendment of Rule 
702 explicitly state that “[t]he rule does not mandate a return to the 
strictures of Frye v. United States.”161 The Daubert Court noted that a strict 
requirement of “general acceptance” limits the “liberal thrust” of the 
Federal Rules, which, under Rule 401, envision the acceptance of evidence 
that is relevant at virtually any level.162 Thus, Daubert explicitly stated that 
the Frye test should not be used in federal courts.163 
In replacing Frye, the Daubert Court provided four nonexclusive 
factors for the judge to consider when determining whether scientific 
evidence is sufficiently reliable:164 
 
• “[W]hether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) 
tested,”165 
• “[W]hether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer 
review and publication,”166 
• “[T]he known or potential rate of error,”167 and 
• The “general acceptance” of the technique.168 
 
159  Id. at 588 (“Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute 
prerequisite to its admissibility . . . [nor] present[s] any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a 
whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.”). 
160  FED. R. EVID. 702 committee note (1975). 
161  Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 157 (1991) (describing the proposed amendment to FED. R. 
EVID. 702 and the accompanying committee notes). 
162  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–88. Rule 401 is a highly lenient rule of relevancy, requiring only that 
evidence have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. 
R. EVID. 401. This rule has been repeatedly determined to be a liberal standard. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN 
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6.01[5][a] (8th ed. 2007). 
163  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”). 
164  Id. at 593–94. 
165  Id. at 593. 
166  Id. This criterion was specifically mentioned by the Court as being “relevant, though not 
dispositive” because “some propositions . . . are . . . too new, or of too limited interest to be published.” 
Id. at 593–94. 
167  Id. at 594. The court did not give any guidelines as to what would constitute an acceptable rate 
of error. 
168  Id. This factor is the very same test from Frye that the Court declared was no longer controlling. 
The Court explained the factor by stating that the Frye test was unnecessarily strict because a “reliability 
assessment does not require . . . an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within the 
community.” Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). But this 
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In 2000, Rule 702 was amended to codify the Daubert factors.169 The 
revised rule provides that an expert may testify as to an opinion only “if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”170 
Typically, when proffered scientific testimony is contested by the 
opposing party, the trial court will hold an evidentiary hearing, called a 
Daubert hearing, to determine the reliability of the testimony.171 The 
remainder of this Part examines the likely outcome of such a hearing as 
applied to the P300-based CIT,172 and to a lesser extent, the fMRI-based 
CQT. 
B. The Daubert Standard Applied to the fMRI-Based CQT 
In the wake of the sudden increase in fMRI-based lie-detection 
research over the past decade,173 a number of scholars anticipated the 
question that would eventually face the court in United States v. Semrau: Is 
the fMRI-based CQT admissible under the Daubert standard?174 Because 
 
factor can have a bearing in the eventual calculus because a known technique that has not been accepted 
in its field should be viewed with skepticism. See id. 
169  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 162, § 13.02[4][a]. The rule also codifies the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that Daubert’s principles apply 
to all expert testimony admissible under Rule 702. FED. R. EVID. 702 committee note (2000). While the 
Daubert standard has been codified into the Federal Rules of Evidence and is therefore used in all 
federal courts, some state courts that have not adopted the rules still use the Frye test in determinations 
of the admissibility of scientific evidence. See, e.g., Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 
2003) (requiring general acceptance of an expert’s methods). 
170  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
171  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 162, § 13.02[4][c][ii]. 
172  As of the writing of this Comment, no federal court has held a formal Daubert hearing regarding 
the admissibility of the CIT. 
173  Prior to 2000, there had been no published research using fMRI to detect deception. However, 
from 2000 to 2008, there were fifteen papers published on the subject. See Kamila E. Sip et al., 
Detecting Deception: The Scope and Limits, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 48, 51 tbl.1 (2008). 
174  Many articles focusing on the admissibility of fMRI-based lie detection are pessimistic as to 
potential admissibility, but some offer countering views. Compare Archie Alexander, Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading Toward the “Gatekeeper”?, 
7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 49–55 (2007) (arguing that fMRI-based lie detection is not generally 
accepted within the field and that the “analytical gap” from experimental studies to practical application 
is too great), Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L. 
REV. 717, 734–36 (2009) (describing the potential uses and limits of cognitive neuroscience in the 
courtroom), Moriarty, supra note 31, at 758–61 (2009) (arguing that the number of fMRI lie-detection 
studies is too small to be considered reliable, that there has been too little replication of past research, 
and that these studies are not close enough to real-life situations to be applicable), and Cooper 
Ellenberg, Note, Lie Detection: A Changing of the Guard in the Quest for Truth in Court?, 33 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 147 (2009) (stating that fMRI-based lie detection does not currently have the 
necessary accuracy rates to reach admissibility but that there is potential for future admissibility), with 
Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading” 
Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1376–79 (2007) (stating that the general widespread acceptance of 
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this question has been well discussed in the legal literature, this Comment 
will not examine each of the Daubert factors as applied to the commercially 
available fMRI-based CQT like the one that was offered in Semrau, but 
instead will examine general acceptance and rate of error, since these 
factors pose the greatest barriers to admissibility.175 
Perhaps the most serious problem for proponents of fMRI-based CQT 
evidence is the lack of general acceptance in the field. This factor warrants 
extra consideration in the analysis because it not only influences federal 
courts and other jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standard, but 
also those states that continue to use the Frye test. It would be very difficult 
to argue that fMRI-based lie detection is “generally accepted” in the field of 
neuroscience. At least one neurologist has called for statutory regulation of 
the method, stating that the high level of discretion by the trial judge under 
the Daubert standard could lead to unwarranted admission of an fMRI-
based CQT.176 Other notable scholars in the field have taken a less extreme 
position, but have firmly stated that the fMRI-based CQT is not ready for 
courts.177 
Some scholars have argued that the mere fact that fMRI itself is 
generally accepted in the field of neuroscience, a proposition that is 
unquestionably true,178 means that fMRI-based lie detection should also be 
considered generally accepted.179 This view misconstrues the meaning of the 
general acceptance test, which analyzes the general acceptance of the 
specific method being applied, not the underlying framework.180 For 
example, general acceptance in the field of biology that humans are made 
up of DNA that is unique on an individual level would not allow for the 
admissibility of forensic DNA evidence until the process of matching an 
 
fMRI research meets the general acceptance test and that the error rate for fMRI-based lie detection is 
lower than that of other forensic evidence that is regularly admitted). 
175  I should also note that some of the studies described here do not follow the traditional CQT 
format, but are instead hybrids between the CQT and other types of lie-detection protocols. While a 
more nuanced approach would be necessary for a complete assessment of the admissibility of these tests, 
the critical distinction here is that these fMRI-based tests all seek to determine whether a person is being 
truthful, as the CQT does, instead of determining whether a person recognizes information related to a 
crime, as the CIT does. Thus, I loosely use the term CQT to refer to these fMRI-based CQT-like tests. 
176  Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for 
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 413 (2007) (“The federal government—or, barring that, state 
governments—should ban any non-research use of new methods of lie detection, including specifically 
fMRI-based lie detection, unless or until the method has been proven safe and effective to the 
satisfaction of a regulatory agency and has been vetted through the peer-reviewed scientific literature.”). 
177  See sources cited supra note 174. 
178  A Google Scholar search for “fMRI” yields thousands of citations in scholarly journals, and 
fMRI is regularly used in neuroscience research. 
179  See, e.g., Kittay, supra note 174, at 1383. 
180  For example, Frye held that a systolic blood pressure test to measure deception was not 
generally accepted despite the fact that the measurement of blood pressure was undoubtedly widely 
accepted in medicine at the time. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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individual with a DNA sample from a crime scene has been generally 
accepted in the field. While scholars agree that fMRI is a valid method, 
there is not broad agreement that its use for lie detection is valid. 
The fMRI-based CQT may also have difficulty meeting the accuracy 
requirement of Daubert. Across the small number of published fMRI-based 
CQT studies, accuracy rates have varied between 78% and 90%.181 While it 
is unclear exactly what error rates are necessary to survive the Daubert 
analysis,182 Leo Kittay has argued that because some types of forensic 
evidence that are commonly admitted, such as fingerprint analysis, have 
lower accuracy rates, fMRI-based lie detection should pass the error rate 
test.183 This argument, however, assumes that these types of forensic 
evidence are being admitted due to their reliability rather than their strong 
tradition of admissibility, which may not be true.184 Just as tradition may 
keep unreliable forensic sciences in the court, the past history of the 
inadmissibility of the CQT conducted using the polygraph may make it 
difficult for the fMRI-based CQT to be admitted. Even if the Daubert 
criteria are met, because courts have rejected lie-detection evidence for 
years, they are likely to remain skeptical of sudden increases in published 
accuracy rates because of a change in the machine used to conduct the 
test.185 Of course, such reasoning is not grounded in the reliability-seeking 
considerations of Daubert, but it is a factor that will likely influence 
admissibility decisions. 
While many of the fMRI-based CQT reliability issues are theoretically 
correctable through further experimentation and refinement, it seems likely 
that the field will take time to address these problems. Combined with the 
 
181  See Kozel et al., supra note 35, at 610 (describing a 90% accuracy rate); Langleben et al., supra 
note 35, at 269 (reporting a 78% accuracy rate). Additionally, these studies have only occurred in lab 
settings and have never tested real-world deception. 
182  The Daubert opinion only mentions that courts “should consider the known or potential rate of 
error.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). The case is silent, however, as 
to what rate of error is sufficient to meet the test. 
183  See Kittay, supra note 174, at 1382. A number of types of commonly admitted forensic evidence 
have recently come under scrutiny for being inaccurate. A 2009 report from the National Research 
Council called for a major overhaul of the forensic sciences, stating that: “In a number of forensic 
science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their 
approach or the accuracy of their conclusions . . . .” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 53 (2009). 
184  Cf. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 571–72 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (recognizing the 
potential for inaccurate fingerprint evidence, but still allowing its use by an expert at trial). 
185  One related problem may be that the probative accuracy may not be enough to overcome the 
prejudicial influence of the test. Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. 
Particularly in unilaterally obtained lie-detection tests, where the test is sought by one of the parties and 
will not be used if the outcome is not to that party’s liking, the probative value is small because the party 
has nothing to lose by taking the test. 
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courts’ long-standing policy against admitting true lie-detection evidence, it 
is unlikely that the fMRI-based CQT will be admitted in the near future. 
C. The Daubert Standard Applied to the CIT 
Unlike the fMRI-based CQT, the P300-based CIT has over twenty 
years of published research supporting it.186 Despite this history, the test has 
rarely been proffered as evidence in court and has been largely ignored in 
both case law and the legal literature.187 There are currently no published 
cases that have conducted a formal Daubert hearing regarding the 
admissibility of either a P300-based or polygraph-based CIT. However, a 
form of the P300-based CIT has been proffered in two state court post-
conviction murder exoneration cases: Harrington v. State, an Iowa case in 
which the P300-based CIT was partially admitted into evidence,188 and 
Slaughter v. State, an Oklahoma case in which the P300-based CIT was 
rejected.189 Both cases considered the admissibility of a P300-based CIT 
conducted by Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, started by Dr. Lawrence 
Farwell, which is the only company that currently offers a commercially 
available CIT.190 Despite these cases and the increasing prevalence of 
neuroimaging evidence in court, no article has thoroughly examined the 
P300-based CIT’s admissibility under Daubert.191 The remainder of this 
Part discusses how the P300-based CIT would fare under each of these 
factors and concludes that while the P300-based CIT should not currently 
 
186  See, e.g., Rosenfeld et al., supra note 48. 
187  A Westlaw search of the “All State and Federal Cases” database conducted on July 6, 2012, for 
“concealed information test” yielded only one result. A search in the same database for “guilty 
knowledge test” (a synonymous term for the CIT) yielded seven additional responses. A search for 
“polygraph” on the same database returned over 10,000 cases. 
188  No. PCCV 073247, at *5–10 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2001). 
189  105 P.3d 832, 835–36 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). The Slaughter court noted that “Dr. Farwell 
makes certain claims about the Brain Fingerprinting test that are not supported by anything other than 
his bare affidavit.” Id. at 834–35. The court also opined that there was no evidence that Brain 
Fingerprinting had been tested, subjected to peer-review, or otherwise met the Daubert factors and thus 
would fail such an analysis. Id. at 836. 
190  BRAIN FINGERPRINTING, http://www.governmentworks.com/bws/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). A 
brain fingerprinting test is similar to other P300-based CITs. A subject is shown probe items that relate 
to a particular crime or event and irrelevant items of the same class that do not relate to the crime or 
event. A larger P300 is expected to occur to probe items if the subject has knowledge of the crime or 
event in question. See Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to 
Detect Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 135, 136 (2001). However, in 
addition to the P300, brain fingerprinting uses a secondary brain response, termed by Farwell as the 
MERMER effect. See id. at 135. The basis for the MERMER effect is never explained by Farwell as it is 
the proprietary secret of the Brain Fingerprinting company. See J. Peter Rosenfeld, ‘Brain 
Fingerprinting’: A Critical Analysis, 4 SCI. REV. MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 20, 23 (2005). 
191  Some articles have discussed the admissibility of the P300-based CIT under Daubert, but have 
not discussed each factor in detail. See, e.g., Erikson, supra note 61; Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the 
Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for Lie Detection, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L., July 2008, 
at 1. 
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be admissible under Daubert, it should be admissible in the future once 
more critical studies are conducted to address its accuracy in real-world 
situations. 
1. Testability.—Testability as described by the Daubert Court is 
likely the easiest factor for the P300-based CIT to meet. Testability, or 
falsifiability, of a scientific theory is typically considered the chief criterion 
of scientific status.192 If a particular test or theory is not falsifiable, it will 
generally not be considered a science and thus will struggle to meet the 
other Daubert criteria.193 In this manner, the testability factor could be 
considered a threshold standard, though it was not labeled as such by the 
Daubert Court. 
Courts would very likely consider the P300-based CIT testable. Like 
any other diagnostic test, the P300-based CIT’s accuracy can be determined 
by conducting the test on an individual for whom ground truth is known.194 
For example, many tests of the P300-based CIT compare CIT results from 
participants who commit a mock crime with results from participants who 
have not committed any crime but are given the same CIT, thereby directly 
testing diagnostic accuracy.195 
One criticism of the CIT’s testability is that it is very difficult to assess 
the CIT’s accuracy in real-world conditions because it would be nearly 
impossible to know whether the suspect had actually committed the crime. 
While this complaint is a valid one for the rate of error factor in the sense 
that experiments of this type have not been conducted and so the error rate 
of the P300-based CIT in the field is not known, it is not true that these 
types of tests could not be conducted. If the CIT were given to a number of 
criminal suspects and incontrovertible independent evidence (such as DNA 
testing) were later revealed that determined the suspect’s guilt or innocence, 
the effectiveness of the CIT in the field could be assessed. Thus, the CIT is 
testable, and though one could argue that it has not yet been fully tested in 
the most realistic scenarios, its basic reliability has been repeatedly tested.196 
 
192  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific 
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (quoting KARL R. POPPER, 
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) 
(emphasis omitted))). A science is generally understood to be falsifiable when it is “capable of empirical 
test” such that the theories on which the method is based could be objectively proven wrong. See id. 
(quoting CARL GUSTAV HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)). 
193  See David L. Faigman et al., Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 1:16. 
194  Ground truth is known in a CIT where the researchers know, a priori, whether a participant 
possesses the concealed information they are attempting to detect. Thus, the researchers can determine 
whether their test came to the correct result, unlike in cases where ground truth is not known. 
195  See, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 2. 
196  See, e.g., Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48; Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44; Rosenfeld et 
al., supra note 48. 
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2. Peer Review, Publication, and General Acceptance in the  
Field.—The P300-based CIT is also likely to pass Daubert’s “peer 
review” factor. The Daubert Court specifically noted that this factor “does 
not necessarily correlate with reliability” but instead reflects “the likelihood 
that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.”197 The CIT has 
undergone substantial peer review.198 As a group of researchers repeatedly 
publish papers using similar methods, these methods become exposed to 
multiple phases of peer review designed to eliminate methodological errors. 
For example, the Rosenfeld lab at Northwestern University has produced 
results of a highly accurate P300-based CIT protocol across three separate 
publications.199 With the repetition of similar studies, it is likely that the 
peer review process will weed out major methodological flaws. 
When a court is considering whether a particular method has been 
subjected to peer review, it must examine the specific method being 
presented. In Harrington, the court noted that while the P300 component 
itself had been “extensively tested and reviewed,” Brain Fingerprinting, 
which uses a specific proprietary “MERMER” algorithm, had not been 
tested.200 Thus, a CIT relying only on the well-published P300 brain wave 
will be considered to be peer reviewed, while modified versions that have 
not been published, like Brain Fingerprinting, will not pass muster. 
Many of the same considerations apply to the question of whether the 
P300-based CIT is “generally accepted” in the field. It is not sufficient that 
the P300 brain wave itself is well-established in the field; its use as an 
indicator of concealed information must be generally accepted as well. The 
Harrington court accepted that the P300 is a reliable marker of the 
recognition of salient information, but was unclear as to whether it accepted 
 
197  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
198  A search on Google Scholar for “P300-based concealed information test” and “P300-based 
guilty knowledge test” conducted on July 6, 2012, revealed more than fifty peer-reviewed publications 
of empirical tests of the CIT on only the first five pages of results, and many more papers have 
undoubtedly been published. These publications have come from a number of labs both within the 
United States and abroad, indicating peer-reviewed replication of the validity of the CIT. 
199  See Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 49; Michael R. Winograd 
& J. Peter Rosenfeld, Mock Crime Application of the Complex Trial Protocol (CTP) P300-Based 
Concealed Information Test, 48 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 155 (2010). It should be noted that the research 
coming from this lab is, in part, my own. However, other labs have also tested the P300-based CIT. See, 
e.g., John J. Allen et al., The Identification of Concealed Memories Using the Event-Related Potential 
and Implicit Behavioral Measures: A Methodology for Prediction in the Face of Individual Differences, 
29 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 504 (1992); Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48; Kenta Kubo & Hiroshi Nittono, 
The Role of Intention to Conceal in the P300-Based Concealed Information Test, 34 APPLIED 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY & BIOFEEDBACK 227 (2009). 
200  See Harrington v. State, No. PCCV 073247, at *8–9 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2001). A full 
explanation of the basis of the MERMER algorithm and the difference between Brain Fingerprinting and 
the more mainstream P300-based CIT is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an excellent discussion 
of this topic, see Rosenfeld, supra note 190. 
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the applied use of the P300 in a CIT.201 However, the court clearly rejected 
the Brain Fingerprinting MERMER effect for lack of general acceptance in 
the field,202 a view that has been supported by a recent publication 
discussing the many problems with Brain Fingerprinting.203 
Unlike the specific Brain Fingerprinting MERMER method, individual 
surveys have shown that the CIT itself is generally accepted.204 William 
Iacono & David Lykken surveyed members of the Society for 
Psychophysiological Research, asking them whether the CQT and CIT were 
“based on scientifically sound psychological principles or theory.”205 Only 
36% of the respondents stated that the CQT was based on scientifically 
sound principles, but 77% agreed that the CIT was scientifically sound.206 
Among members of the American Psychological Association, the results 
were very similar, with 30% and 72% agreeing that the CQT and CIT were 
scientifically sound, respectively.207 This survey was conducted in 1997, and 
with the increasing existence of publications regarding the CIT, it is likely 
that this acceptance rate has increased. While these numbers do not indicate 
complete confidence among the scientific community in the CIT, it is 
unlikely that the general acceptance factor would keep the CIT out of the 
courtroom. 
3. Rate of Error.—The Daubert Court did not specify what error rate 
is tolerable for admissibility. This has left courts confused in interpreting 
error rates of various types of scientific testimony.208 However, while this 
may seem like simple oversight or reluctance to form an easily applied 
bright-line rule on the part of the Daubert Court, the failure to specify a 
maximum error rate is defensible on the grounds that differing error rates 
are acceptable in different contexts. Where the cost of making a mistake is 
higher, a lower maximum error rate should be required.209 For example, “a 
judge might require a relatively low error rate before admitting predictions 
of violence in a capital case, but permit higher error rates in a probation 
matter.”210 This distinction does not run merely across the potential level of 
punishment either. Thus, a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prejudice 
determination is naturally intertwined with determining the acceptable level 
of error—in cases where the expert’s testimony is highly likely to prejudice 
 
201  Harrington, No. PCCV 073247, at *9. 
202  Id. 
203  See Rosenfeld, supra note 190. 
204  See, e.g., W.G. Iacono & D.T. Lykken, The Validity of the Lie Detector: Two Surveys of 
Scientific Opinion, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 426, 426–28 (1997). 
205  Id. at 430 tbl.2. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. 
208  See Faigman, supra note 193, § 1:20. 
209  See id. § 1:21. 
210  Id. 
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the jury and become a critical piece of evidence in the case, the error rate 
will likely be viewed more strictly. 
Under this rationale, one can envision the error rate of the CIT being 
judged very differently depending on the context of the case. Research on 
the CIT has been predominantly in the criminal context,211 making the 
evidence likely to be considered more prejudicial and thus requiring a 
higher standard of accuracy. In a murder trial, for example, the result of the 
CIT could be a critical piece of information that determines whether the 
defendant is convicted, and thus likely to be highly prejudicial. In this case, 
a trial judge would be wise to require a high accuracy rate. However, in 
other applications of the CIT where the potential prejudice is lower, such as 
showing that an employee had knowledge of his employer’s discriminatory 
hiring practices, a higher rate of error may be acceptable. 
While this determination will always be a case-by-case decision for the 
trial judge, recent P300-based CITs show promise to meet even the high 
standard of accuracy that might be required at a criminal trial. One recent 
study achieved a 100% accuracy rate among twenty-four participants being 
tested for knowledge of a mock terrorist attack.212 Another paper from the 
same laboratory reported a 92% accuracy rate, with one false negative and 
one false positive among twenty-four participants.213 Most other studies 
have typically found an 80% to 90% overall accuracy rate.214 
However, the overall accuracy rate of a method is not the only 
consideration. The error rate is comprised of two types of errors: “false 
positives,” which are cases in which a person does not have concealed 
knowledge but is detected as having such knowledge, and “false negatives,” 
which are cases in which a person has concealed knowledge but it is not 
detected by the test. These two types of errors cannot be viewed as equal: in 
the criminal trial, for example, where the burden of proof is designed to 
ensure that innocent parties are not wrongfully convicted, a low false-
positive rate is extremely important in any type of forensic test. 
One of the CIT’s strong points is that the false-positive error rate is 
extremely low.215 In a CIT where the participant is shown one probe item 
and four irrelevant items, an innocent participant would be expected to 
show the largest P300 response to the probe item entirely by chance 20% of 
the time. So, for example, if an individual accused of murder were shown 
 
211  See, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44. 
212  Id. at 150–51 & tbl.1. 
213  Rosenfeld et al., supra note 49, at 913 tbl.3b. 
214  See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 199; Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48, at 539 tbl.2; Rosenfeld 
et al., supra note 48, at 161; J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., Simple, Effective Countermeasures to P300-Based 
Tests of Detection of Concealed Information, 41 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 205, 209 & tbl.1 (2004). One 
recent test reported an accuracy rate as low as 50%. Mertens & Allen, supra note 152, at 293 tbl.3. 
215  See Iacono, supra note 24, at 689 (“A properly administered [CIT] with a sufficient number of 
items has almost no chance of producing a false positive outcome.”). 
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different weapons, with a gun being the weapon used to commit the crime 
and four other weapons as irrelevants, an innocent person would have the 
largest response to the gun one-fifth of the time. However, as more classes 
of questions are presented, this false-positive rate becomes exponentially 
smaller. Thus, if the same individual were shown five weapons in one block 
of testing and five addresses where the crime might have been committed in 
a separate block, an innocent individual would only be expected to show the 
largest P300 response to both probe items in one out of 25 cases, or about 
4% of the time. If a third block is added, this number shrinks to one out of 
125, and so on. A recent study that used this approach of testing multiple 
blocks of items found a 0% false-positive rate,216 and most other P300-based 
CITs have reported false-positive error rates below 10%.217 
Even if high rates of false negative errors are found in a P300-based 
CIT conducted on real crime suspects, there is still hope for admissibility. If 
the false-positive error rate approaches zero, then even with a high false-
negative rate, the test still has probative value because in cases where the 
test produces a positive result, jurors can be more certain that the defendant 
has concealed knowledge. 
Looming over all of these considerations, however, is one very large 
problem for proponents of the P300-based CIT: there have not been any 
studies of the P300-based CIT conducted on actual criminal suspects and 
seeking information about their crimes. Thus, it remains unknown whether 
the reported high accuracy rates from laboratory tests will translate to the 
field. There is some reason for concern because one polygraph-based CIT 
study conducted on actual suspects found high rates of false negative 
errors.218 Such a test has not been done using the P300-based CIT. This 
problem was specifically noted by the Semrau court with regard to the 
fMRI-based CQT and is likely to be fatal to attempts to admit a P300-based 
CIT until such studies are conducted.219 Interestingly, accuracy rates in the 
field may actually exceed those in the laboratory because criminals who 
planned crimes might be intimately familiar with the details of the crime, 
leading to better recognition of those details and thereby larger P300 
responses as compared to test participants who are only briefly exposed to 
the crime-related details.220 However, this remains conjecture; it should not 
be relied upon until it has been empirically tested. 
 
216  Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 151 tbl.1. There is no reason that other CITs could not 
follow the same approach; one could employ a block for every crime-related detail that a suspect is 
likely to recognize. 
217  See, e.g., Rosenfeld et al., supra note 48. 
218  Eitan Elaad, Detection of Guilty Knowledge in Real-Life Criminal Investigations, 75 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 521, 526 (1990) (correctly detecting only 50% of guilty individuals). 
219  United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 
2010) (“[T]here are no known error rates for fMRI-based lie detection outside the laboratory setting, i.e. 
in the ‘real-world’ or ‘real-life’ setting.”). 
220  See Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 154. 
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Thus, the CIT likely meets the testability, peer review, and general 
acceptance prongs of Daubert. However, until field studies are conducted 
using the P300-based CIT, courts are unlikely to find error rates generated 
through laboratory tests to be sufficient to admit the CIT into evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The law is at a crossroads regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony that assists the trier of fact in assessing credibility. As the 
accuracy of fMRI and P300-based methods improve and become more 
available to litigants both in the civil and criminal realms, courts must make 
moral decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence in addition to 
decisions based solely on accurate trial outcomes. 
In addition to the factors discussed above that are relevant to 
admissibility, courts will have to decide whether they truly want machines 
to aid jurors in determining whether a witness is lying or whether a witness 
had knowledge of information relating to a crime. Even a test that is 
accurate enough to meet the Daubert standard will have serious 
implications for perceived systemic legitimacy if it is persuasive enough to 
yield a conviction without other strong supporting evidence but is not 
accurate enough to ensure that an innocent person is never misdiagnosed.221 
It is not clear whether this reduction in procedural justice would be worth 
the gain in trial accuracy, though one could argue that modern forensic 
science has the same problem yet continues to be admitted. Additionally, 
there is a certain unease with using a mental state as evidence of a crime, 
and an undesirable invasion of privacy could result from broad use of these 
tools. These philosophical and policy questions, while beyond the scope of 
this Comment, are worthy of further consideration, and must be approached 
before we hand credibility assessment off to scientific experts. 
However, the case against the trier of fact’s status as the most accurate 
assessor of credibility continues to mount. The American common law has 
consistently restricted decisions of credibility to the trier of fact, but recent 
social science indicates that judges and jurors do not accurately use 
demeanor cues offered by a witness to assess credibility. While studies that 
put the testimony of a liar or truth teller in context show more promise for 
the ability of laypeople to assess the veracity of witnesses, they still do not 
approach the accuracy rates boasted by the modern P300-based CIT. 
However, the jury is still out on the jury’s ability to detect lies in the 
courtroom, as studies that provide mock jurors with the rich context of a 
full trial have not been conducted. 
For now, the science behind modern neuroscience-based credibility-
assessment tools has not yet reached the standards that Daubert requires for 
 
221  Cf. supra note 79 (discussing potential goals of the trial system that are not related to outcome 
accuracy). 
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admissibility at trial. The fMRI-based CQT remains inconsistent in 
accuracy rates and has the same theoretical issues that have plagued the 
polygraph-based CQT for years. The P300-based CIT, however, meets 
many of the Daubert factors—it has been well tested throughout the 
psychological literature and has consistently achieved high levels of 
accuracy. Still, admissibility is not appropriate until realistic field tests of 
the P300-based CIT are conducted. 
However, the science behind these methods should progress quickly. 
As it does, courts should not preclude these devices, which could help the 
trier of fact make more accurate credibility decisions, leading to more 
accurate trial outcomes. As it becomes more apparent that the jury alone 
may not be the most accurate assessor of credibility, courts should consider 
abandoning the tradition of the trier of fact as the sole assessor of 
credibility. Though these methods are not yet ready for use in trials, the 
court should not render its verdict against neuroscience-based credibility 
assessment before it has heard all of the evidence. 
 
